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SOME KEY PRINCIPLES FOR A LASTING SOLUTION OF THE
STATUS OF KOSOVA: UTI POSSIDETIS, THE ETHNIC PRINCIPLE,
AND SELF-DETERMINATION
ZEJNULLAH GRUDA, PHD*
I. THE OPTIONS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE KOSOVA ISSUE
Kosova is a subject sui generis. Resolution 1244 placed Kosova under
the mandate of the U.N. and authorized an international civil and security
presence.) Resolution 1244 stresses the temporary character of the current
situation and envisions that the future status of Kosova will be determined
later. The Resolution leaves open all options for final status, from the inde-
pendence of Kosova up to the restoration of Serbian authority. Different
analysts, diplomats, and forums that have dealt with the issue of final status
have presented various options, some of greater interest a few years ago,
and others of greater interest now. The following options and solutions
either have been suggested in the past and are now discarded or impossible,
or are currently on the bargaining table:
1. The preservation of the status quo Preservation of the status
quo was obviously one option before the NATO bombings.
Kosova would have continued to be governed from Belgrade,
and Serbian police and military forces would have continued
to enforce Serbian law. This option was rejected by the Con-
tact Group, which was originally formed to promote peace in
Bosnia.2 A return to the status quo is a possibility if all nego-
tiations between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs and strategies
by the international community fail. A reinstatement of Ser-
bian authority over Kosova is unlikely, however, as Kosovar
Albanians would probably never accept such an extreme
solution.
* Professor of Law, University of Prishtina; Ambassador of the SFRY (1957-1978); Member of
the Government of Kosova and Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1978-1981).
1. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg. 5, 6, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(1999).
2. Craig R. Whitney, NATO Authorizes Kosova Air Raids if Serbs Bar Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
31, 1999, § 1, at 1. The Contact Group members are Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and the
United States.
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2. The autonomy of 1974-minus The 1968 amendments to the
Yugoslav Constitution and the Constitution of Socialist Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslav ("SFRY") of 1974 in particular
granted Kosova full autonomy and many of the same powers
as a republic within the Yugoslav federation.3 Constitution-
ally, Yugoslavia was a union of socialist republics and social-
ist provinces, united by free will, in which the nations and
nationalities were equal.4 Kosova was one of the eight consti-
tutive parts of the SFRY. 5 Kosova was directly represented in
the organs of the federation. According to the Constitution,
the peoples of Kosova and Vojvodina realized their sovereign
rights without any subordination to Serbia. Kosova had,
among other entities, its own parliament, presidency, govern-
ment, and ministries. 6 The federation achieved its interests
through federal agencies "with participation on terms of
equality and responsibility of the Republics and Autonomous
Provinces" and on the "basis of decisions of or agreement by
the Republics and Autonomous Provinces [i.e. with their con-
sent]. ' '7 Indeed, Kosova had representation in the presidency
of the SFRY, similar to the other units.8 Furthermore, certain
decisions in the Chamber of the Republics and Provinces re-
quired unanimity of the republics and provinces, including
amendments to the federal Constitution.9 This autonomous
status was revoked by the Milosevic regime in the late 1980s.
The "autonomy of 1974-minus" option would have restored
3. HUGH POULTON, TILE BALKANS: MINORITIES AND STATES IN CONFLICT 60 (1991); KURTESH
SALIHU, NASTANAK, RAZVOJ, POLOZAJ I ASPEKTI AUTONOMNOSTI SOCIALISTICKE AUTONOMNE
POKRAJINE KosOVA U SOCIALISTICKOJ JUGOSLAVIJI [THE ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, POSITION, AND
ASPECTS OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE SOCIALIST AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF KosOVA IN SOCIALIST
YUGOSLAVIA] (Pristina 1985).
4. SOCIALIST FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONST. art. 1, 245 (1974), reprinted in
YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS: FROM ITS CREATION TO ITS DISSOLUTION 224, 225, 229
(Sneiana Trifunovska ed., 1994).
5. Id. at art2.
6. SOCIALIST AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF KOSOVA CONST. art. 301, 349, 372, 390 (1974),
translated in HELSINKI COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA, KOSOVA: LAW AND POLITICS, KOSOVA
IN NORMATIVE ACTS BEFORE AND AFTER 1974, at 38, 45, 47 (1998).
7. SOCIALIST FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONST. art. 244, reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA
THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 229.
8. Id at art. 321, reprinted in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIUC OF
YUGOSLAVIA 260 (Dragoljub Durovi6 ed., Marko Pavi~i6 trans., 1974) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION OF
THE SFRY].
9. Id. at art. 398, reprinted in CONSTITUTION OF THE SFRY, supra note 8, at 299; SOCIALIST
AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF KOSOVA CONST. art. 288, 399, translated in HELSINKI COMM. FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA, supra note 6.
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most, but not all, of this autonomy and was unacceptable to
the Kosovar Albanians, because it gave them less than Mil-
osevic had deprived them of illegitimately.
3. The autonomy of 1974-plus This option, which would have
restored the autonomy guaranteed by the 1974 Constitution
along with additional protections, was the official stance of
the West and was incorporated into Resolution 1244, which
guaranteed Kosova a "substantial autonomy within the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia."10 Resolution 1244 was sup-
posed to be a temporary solution, which would eventually
lead to independence. This view was reiterated in the meeting
of the Foreign Ministers of the G-8, held in Petersberg, Ger-
many, on May 6, 1999.11 This solution was disputed because
Kosova can enter the process of European integration only as
a state; critics fear it will otherwise turn into a black hole.
12
4. A step-by-step solution This option would have begun with a
period of international administration, followed by local elec-
tions for provisional government institutions, a plebiscite, and
then the implementation of whatever status in which the plebi-
scite would result. The goal of this solution would be to facili-
tate a peaceful separation.
5. Part of a Serbian unitary state This option would have
placed a nonautonomous Kosova into a Serbian state. Obvi-
ously, such a result would be unacceptable to Kosovar
Albanians.
6. Unification with Albania Unification with Albania was offi-
cially introduced as an option by Sali Berisha, the President of
Albania, at the end of March 1992.13 Later, Berisha lowered
his rhetoric to better match the mood of the Albanian public. 14
This option does not have wide support in Albania or in Kos-
10. S.C. Res. 1244, supranote 1, } 10.
11. Id. at Annex 1; Crisis in the Balkans; U.N Resolution on Kosova: Establishing the Principles
of a Political Solution, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1999, at A13; 2 ARSIM BAJRAMI, E DREJTA E KoSOVES NE
TRANZICION [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 262-69 (Prishtind 2002). The G-8 is comprised of the major
industrial democracies and meets annually to deal with major economic and political issues facing
international society. Its members are Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Japan, Canada, and the
United States.
12. Richard C. Hottelet, The Kosova Quandary, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Apr. 24, 2001, at 1t;
KOHA DITORE, May 1, 2001 (Koha Ditore is a local Albanian-language newspaper. In all cases, page
references were unavailable.).
13. MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE THIRD BALKAN WAR 181 (1992).
14 Id
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ova (apart from minor groups such as the People's Movement
of Kosova, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kos-
ova, the Republican Party of Kosova, and the Albanian Na-
tional Democratic Party).l 5
7. A federal unit or a republic within the rump state of
Yugoslavia This option would have guaranteed Kosova equal
status with Serbia and Montenegro within a rump Yugoslavia
and was supported by the Contact Group in January 1998.16
8. An international protectorate This "temporary" solution
was adopted in 1999. As conceived, the international protec-
torate would be interim in nature, after which the people of
Kosova would be allowed to decide on final status. 17 Security
Council Resolution 1244 provides for civil administration of
Kosova under the authority of a Special Representative of the
Secretary-General; the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosova ("UNMIK") also is directed to facilitate a
determination of "future status." 18
9. Member of a confederation The idea for the creation of a
"mini-confederation" in the Balkans, consisting of the repub-
lics of Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosova, 19 was supported by
Kofi Annan in 2000.20
10. The regionalization of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
("FRY") The FRY would comprise thirteen regions. Kosova
would be divided into two regions, Kosova and Dukagjini (or
Metohija, as the Serbs prefer to call it).
15. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, ICG EUR. REP. No. 153, PAN-ALBANIANISM: How BIG A THREAT TO
BALKAN STABILITY? 2, 14 (Feb. 25, 2004), at http://www.icg.org//library/documents/europe/bal-
kans/ 153_pan_albanianism how big.pdf.
16. Barbara Crossette, U.N. Chief Reports Little Help in Monitoring Balkan Arms Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1998, at A3; KONIA DITORE, Jan. 10, 1998.
17. For some options see Zoran Lutovac, Dymbdhjet( propozime per zgiidhjen e statusit te
Kosovgs [Twelve Proposals for the Solution of the Status of Kosova], KONA DITORE, Apr. 25 & 26,
1997.
18. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 1, 11(e).
19. MILOS MINIC, RATOVI NA Kosovu, 1998-1999 1 U CECENII, 1994-1996 [THE WARS IN
KOSOVA, 1998-1999 AND CHECI4NYA, 1994-1996] 133 (2000). Milos Minic was one of the most
famous Serbs during Tito's rule. During the 1970s, he was Foreign Minister of SFRY.
20. Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Kofi Annan at Headquarters, 19 De-
cember 2000, M2 PRESSwIRE, Dec. 21, 2000, available in LexisNexis AllNews Database and on file
with the Chicago-Kent Law Review. Secretary-General Annan stated:
In my judgment, I think the ideal situation would be to work out some sort of confederation
embracing the three territories and settle the issue in that manner, and then begin to operate
the problem on a regional basis and give meaning to the regional Stability Pact and other ef-
forts the international community is trying to make.
Id.; see also KOHA DITORE, Dec. 21, 2000 (statement given after the meeting of the UNSC).
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11. Standards before status This formula was introduced by Mi-
chael Steiner, the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General to Kosova, and has won the support of the interna-
tional community.21 According to this formula, a number of
standards must be fulfilled within a certain period of time and
are prerequisite to international recognition. In the meantime,
Kosova would become the beneficiary of a political trustee-
ship, the main aim of which would be the political, economic,
social, and educational advancement of the population of the
trust territory. By doing so, an end would be given to the
Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosova-without recognizing
Kosova as an international subject. Kosova would enjoy
greater self-government than the one guaranteed by the Con-
stitutional Framework. 22
12. Conditional independence This option recognizes the right
of the people of Kosova to decide on their future and ad-
dresses the legitimate concerns of the international commu-
nity regarding the fact that Kosova is still not ready for full
independence. This option had the support of the International
Crisis Group. 23 There are many cases where conditions have
been imposed upon new states, the fulfillment of which would
not have been accepted voluntarily. The EU adopted certain
criteria for the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union, including the acceptance of in-
ternational obligations; the observation of ethnic, national,
and minority rights; and the recognition of the inviolability of
borders.
13. The creation of two entities using the model of Bosnia-
Herzegovina This scenario, which envisions the division of
Kosova into two entities, Albanian and Serb, was first floated
by Nebojsa Covic, Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia. 24 The
21. Daniel Simpson, A Restive Kosova, Officially Still Serbian, Squirms Under the Status Quo,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, § 1, at 14.
22. Standards for Kosova, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosova, U.N Doe.
UNMIKIPR/1078 (Dec. 10, 2003), at http://www.unmik-online.org/press/2003/pressr/prI078.pdf.
23. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, ICG BALKANS REP. No. 124, A KOSOVA ROADMAP (I): ADDRESSING
FINAL STATUS ii (Mar. 1, 2002), at http://www.icg.org//library/documents/report-arch-
ive/A400561 01032002.pdf.; see also KOHA DITORE, Mar. 4-19, 2002. For conditional recognition see
ZEJNULLAH GRUDA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (Prishtina 2002).
24. Stefan Wagstyl & Judy Dempsey, Dangerous Potential: A Macedonian Civil War Would
Threaten the Stability of Other States in the Former Yugoslavia Now Enjoying a Fragile Peace, FIN.
TIMES (London), May 29, 2001, at 20.
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Serb entity would be under the control of the Yugoslav police
and military forces, and the Albanian entity would be given a
high level of autonomy under the supervision of the interna-
tional community. This scenario has the support of the Ser-
bian government. Its implementation began in 2003 through
the creation of parallel structures in the areas with a Serb ma-
jority. In the opinion of this author, however, the Serb major-
ity's main concern is not to secure equal rights with the
Albanians, but to help restore Serbian rule in Kosova (or part
of it).
14. The division of Kosova along ethnic lines, more or less at
the municipality level This solution would use ethnic criteria
and overlaps the following cantonization option.
15. The cantonization of Kosova This option, a more detailed
version of option number fourteen, was suggested by Serbian
leaders and would retain Kosova within the Union of Serbia
and Montenegro but divide Kosova along ethnic lines. Can-
tonization is supported by the Serbs of Kosova who claim that
they cannot live together with the Albanians after the renewed
violence in March 2004.25 Serbs in Kosova would prefer the
borders of the cantons to be drawn using the land-registry
books and the ethnic composition of the population. 26 Accord-
ing to the Serb leaders in Kosova, Kosova should be divided
into seven cantons-four Albanian and three Serb. In the Serb
cantons, Serbs would have their own police, judiciary, and
budget, and they would also have the right to be represented
in regional international organizations.2 7 Although a similar
option was presented by Archbishop Artemije, head of the
Serbian Orthodox Church for Kosova, in Washington, D.C., in
2004,28 these views are not supported by political leaders in
25. Daniel Williams, In Kosova, Two Worlds Divided by One River, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2004,
at A16.
26. Milorad Todorovic, coordinator in the office of the Prime Minister of Kosova, on the return of
internally displaced persons.
27. Serbian Unity Congress, New Serbian Premier on Kosova and Metohija Issue, ERPKIM Info-
Service (Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska-Prizren and Kosova-Metohija), Mar. 3, 2004, at
http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2OO4/March_03/20.html; ZERI, Mar. 31, 2004.
28. Ann Rodgers, On a Mission from Kosova: In Visit to City, Serbian Bishop Calls Homeland an
"Open Wound", PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETtE, Feb. 11, 2004, at A6. According to Bishop Artemije, the
places with a Serb majority would have special ties with Serbia in the fields of education; health care;
and in the protection of cultural. historic, and religious monuments, whereas the institutions in the
places with an Albanian majority would have a high level of independence. (The fields of cooperation
with the institutions of Serbia would be determined through mutual agreements.) This proposal does not
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Kosova, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
the State Department, NATO, or the EU. 29 To some, such
views are nothing else but a call for territorial division. 30
16. Independence for Kosova Neither the international commu-
nity nor the Contact Group support this option. 31 Nonetheless,
independence was seen as the inevitable solution for Kosova
by Lord Owen, the international mediator for Yugoslavia and
the EU peace envoy for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkans.
According to Lord Owen, the independence of Kosova could
not be viewed as an isolated issue. Therefore, the international
community should be ready to consider the redefinition of
borders in the Balkans, which would be done in a peace con-
ference (similar to the Berlin Congress in 1878).32
Based on the developments of the past few years, only two or three of
these solutions are workable: independence, conditional independence, and
independence combined with decentralization. Nationalist forces in Serbia
and the Serbs in Kosova wish to restore Serbia's authority over Kosova.
Their argument is that the independence of Kosova will lead to war; 33 thus,
the subjugation of the Kosovar Albanian people is justified. Albanians, as
well as the members of the non-Serb minorities in Kosova, hope that Kos-
ova will finally becomeca democratic, independent state and will join the
family of nations as an independent state.
As far as the options for the final status of Kosova are concerned, the
aspirations of Albanians and Serbs have proven completely opposed to one
another. Thus, the international community has, will, and must exert its
influence to resolve the question. The international community reflects the
plethora of political, economic, cultural, religious, historic, and ethnic con-
say what would happen with the other minority groups and what kind of a community Kosova would be
if its institutions (which would be multiethnic) "would... work on resolving the local problems con-
cerning the common interest of all Kosova's inhabitants and would not act as para-state structures, as
they do now." Bishop Artemije Gives Lecture at Western Policy Center in Washington D.C., ERPKIM
Info-Service (Serbian Orthodox Dioceses of Raska-Prizren and Kosova-Metohija), Jan. 30, 2004;
DIJALOG ZA KoSOVA, Jan, 2004.
29. Ian Traynor, Fourteen Dead as Ethnic Violence Sweeps Kosova: U.N. Peacekeepers Struggle
to Contain Gun Battles, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 18, 2004, at 10 ("The notion was dismissed by
Harri Holkeri, the U.N.'s Finnish governor of the province. 'Partition is not an issue we can discuss,' he
said."); KOHA DiTORE, Mar. 4, 6, 9, 2004.
30. Janusz Bugajski, Koshtunica Against Kosova, KOt-A DITORE, Mar. 9, 2004.
31. Whitney, supra note 2, at 1.
32. Lord David Owen, Commentary, Kosova Isn't Bosnia; tile Serbs are Strong; NATO: The
Conditions are Different; Bombing Won't Work, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1999, at B7.
33. See Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, Conclusion: Kosova Independence and Regional Stability Are
Not Incompatible, in WHAT STATUS FOR KoSOVA? 103, 108 (Inst. for Security Stud. of W. Eur., Chail-
lot Paper 50, Oct. 2001).
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cerns that are interested in the final status of Kosova. Unfortunately for
Kosova, the international community has not been consistent in its treat-
ment of emerging states. Additionally, past atrocities, such as those in Bos-
nia and Chechnya, have been tolerated by the U.N. and the governments of
the most powerful states in the world.34 The international community did
not prevent such atrocities but looked upon them passively. For example,
the EU called for a settlement in Chechnya "which respects the territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation," 35 the stance also taken by the Clinton
Administration.36
Despite these hypocrisies, on many occasions the international com-
munity has played a very important role in the determination of the fate of
different peoples and states. As far as Kosova is concerned, the stance of
the international community is still unresolved. This can be seen by the
different propositions of almost all of the documents pertaining to Kosova.
Documents, states, and international organizations cover the whole range of
positions from supporting Serb aspirations to the independence of Kosova.
Contrary to what would be expected, there are states and individuals who
still continue to think in the spirit of the Holy Alliance or the "European
Concert" and envision an international peace conference that would deter-
mine the final status of Kosova, with or without a redrawing of borders.
Some powerful leaders still wish to deny Kosova~the fundamental right to
self-determination. 37 Their positions reveal their own self-interests as many
34. For example, Richard Nixon, former President of the United States, wrote, "It is an awkward
but unavoidable truth that had the citizens of Sarajevo been predominantly Christian or Jewish, the
civilized world would not have permitted the siege to reach the point it did." RICHARD NIXON, BEYOND
PEACE 154 (1994).
35. lan Bell, An Old Charmer in a New World, HERALD (Glasgow), Jan. 20, 1995, at 11.
36. MINIC, supra note 19, at 246, 253; Charles Babington, Clinton Lobbies Two Nations; Russia
Pressed on Rights, ABM: Ukraine on Free-Market Reform, WASH. POST, June 6, 2000, at Al ("Clinton
said, 'the United States wants a strong Russia, a Russia strong enough to protect its territorial integrity
while respecting that of its neighbors; strong enough to meet threats to its security to give its people
their chance to live their dreams."'); KOHA DITORE, June 6, 2000.
37. For example, John Kornblum, Undersecretary of State, openly declared that the administration
did not support the independence of Kosova. Albanian Leader Says Talks With U.S. Envoy Very Signifi-
cant, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 21, 1997, available in LexisNexis AllNews
Database and on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review KOHA DITORE, Apr. 21, 1997. A similar
statement was made by James Rubin, the spokesperson of the State Department, who declared, "We
have always said we do not support independence for Kosova, and we do not support independence for
Kosova now." R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Officials Expect Kosova Independence: Secession Increasingly Is
Seen as Inevitable, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1999, at Al; KOHA DITORE, Sept. 25, 1999. On June 2,
2000, the very same was reiterated in a more implicit way by President Clinton. He stated, "[Peace]
cannot be [achieved] by forcing people to live together; there is no bringing back the old Yugoslavia. It
cannot be done by giving every community its own country, army, and flag. Shifting so many borders
in the Balkans will only shake the peace further." Remarks on Receiving the International Charlemagne
Prize in Aachen, Germany, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1262, 1264 (June 5, 2000); KOHA DITOPE,
June 3, 2000.
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of them face independence movements or efforts for secession in their own
countries. 38
But some leaders that take an anti-independence stance state a differ-
ent reason. Because of the timing of the talks for the determination of the
final status of Kosova, some leaders seek to ensurc that the provisional
institutions in Kosova are capable of providing stability within the borders
of Kosova and of protecting human and minority rights. Regardless, by
defending the principle of legitimacy and exalting formal retention of Ser-
bian sovereignty over Kosova, they deny all of the positive developments
in international law to Kosova, especially the right to self-determination.
II. THE DECISIVE FACTORS FOR THE CREATION OF NEW STATES
The creation of new states has been supported or obstructed based on
a number of principles of international law, including the principles of le-
gitimacy, balance of forces, nationality, and inviolability of borders.
A. The Principle of Legitimacy
Proponents of the principle of legitimacy object to pending or exe-
cuted changes that are not in accordance with the existing or recently exist-
ing order.39 The principle of legitimacy has often been used to restore past
regimes or regain colonial empires, especially in the time of the Holy Alli-
ance. The aim was to prevent revolutionary changes in Europe, and the
result was a denial of the right of people to self-determination.
Those powerful countries that justified their empires by the principle
of legitimacy hypocritically denied its application, for example, during the
war for the liberation of Greece from the Ottoman Empire, a war of libera-
tion of Christians from Muslims. Similarly, the cases of Kosova and East
Timor show the existence of double standards: that the selective application
of the principle of legitimacy depends on political, ideological, or religious
factors. No other explanation can reconcile the different treatment of East
Timor and Kosova; the U.N. and the powerful countries of the world sup-
ported self-determination for the East Timorese, while those very same
actors deny the right to Kosova.
38. For example Russia has continued problems with Chechnya, as does China with Tibet,
Sinkiang, and Taiwan; India with Kashmir; Spain with the Basque country and Catalonia, England with
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales; France with Corsica; Turkey with Kurdistan; and Canada with
Quebec.
39. VLADIMIR IBLER, RJECNIK MEDJUNARODNOG JAVNOG PRAVA 135 (Zagreb 1972).
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Sergio Viera de Mello, the special envoy of the U.N. to East Timor,
justified the support of the East Timorese by the fact that the president of
Indonesia gave the citizens of East Timor the opportunity to decide on their
own fate.40 Because of an agreement between Indonesia and Portugal, the
citizens of East Timor participated in a U.N.-sponsored referendum for
independence. 41 An overwhelming number of East Timorese voted for
independence. 42 The Security Council transferred power to the independent
East Timor on May 20, 2002.43 Nonetheless, in the opinion of this author,
de Mello did not give the real reason why'this right is not recognized in
Kosova. In order to do so, one must have great courage and strong moral
determination, as one must say something which no one dares to say: that
there is a double standard when dealing with Muslims and Christians.
If we bear in mind the above assertion, we can better understand the
problems in Kashmir, Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kosova-all in-
stances in which the aspirations of a Muslim population for self-
determination are denied by the international community. The international
community did, however, intervene in Kosova, and this intervention can
support the inference that the international community is willing to support
the nationalist aspirations of a Muslim population. But the proof is not in
the intervention; the proof is in the willingness to grasp the nettle of final
status and to accept independence for Kosova. Ambivalence undercuts the
moral credibility of the U.N. and the democratic countries of the world.
Regarding the events in Bosnia, Srda Popovi6, a distinguished Serb dissi-
dent, wrote, "the Security Council, not having the courage to fulfill its obli-
gations and to prevent genocide, has been very careful not to use the words
'aggression' and 'genocide.' 44
In October 1998, Milos Minic criticized the international community
for its delay in reacting to the tragic events in Bosnia and Kosova:
The international community has failed to react in Kosova. The very
same had happened in Bosnia. If the international community had
stopped the war earlier, less people would have been killed on both sides.
The number of villages, which have been looted and destroyed by the
Serbian police and military forces, would have been smaller. Hundreds
of thousands of Albanians would have not been forced to flee their
40- KOHA DITORE, June 14, 2000.
41. Richard C. Paddock, World Welcomes East Timor; War-Torn Territory Becomes a Nation
After ColonialRule, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 2002, at 4; KOHA DIToRE, Mar. 16, 1999.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. SRDA POPOVIC, PUT U VARVARSTVO [THE WAY TOWARD BARBARISM], Biblioteka Svedo~an-
stva No. 4, at 213-14 (Beograd 2000) (citing Srda Popovid, Tribunal (Publikacija Instituta za izvettaje
o ratu i miru [Inst. for War & Peace Reporting] (Aug. 1995))).
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homes in order to save their lives, in a process which had the dimensions
of "ethnic cleansing." Ethnic cleansing was not a consequence of the
armed conflict but one of the main objectives of the offensive of the po-
lice and military forces in Kosova .... 45
This sentiment was reiterated by Zarko Korac and Gunter Gras. The former
stated that the Jews were the symbol of sacrifice, whereas in Yugoslavia
the Albanians and Muslims played that "role."4 6 Gunter Gras stated that the
majority of atrocities in Bosnia and Kosova were committed against
Muslims. 4 7
B. The Balance of Forces Principle
The balance of forces principle reflects the "realist school" of interna-
tional relations theory, which emphasizes geopolitical relationships among
states and de-emphasizes human rights. The balance of forces principle
justifies political and legal arrangements that prevent any state from be-
coming either globally or regionally dominant. This principle was often
used to justify the enslavement and partition of small nations or to prevent
national unification. Austria, Russia, and Prussia justified their partition of
Poland as a balancing of forces following the French Revolution. 48 Western
European powers prevented the unification of Germany before 187149 and
after WWII based on a balance of power theory. 50 For similar reasons,
Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria divided Macedonia amongst themselves after
the first and second Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913.51
The resistance towards the unification into an Albanian nation derives
from the idea that it would create an Albanian state of 5-6 million inhabi-
tants and "destroy" the equilibrium in the Balkans. Opposition exists de-
spite the fact that other countries in the region have approximately the same
number of inhabitants (Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia for example) or a
45. MINIC, supra note 19, at 73-74, 118.
46. Zarko Korac is a professor at the University of Belgrade. He was the Deputy Prime Minister
of Serbia. Helsinska poveija, Bilten Helsinskog odbora za ljudska prava u Srbiji No. 5, at 25 (Apr.
1998).
47. Gunter Gras is a German writer with social orientation and a great critic of the contemporary
system of values. KOHA DITORE, Nov. 12, 1999.
48. CHARLES DOWNER HAZEN, MODERN EUROPE 314 (1920); EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER,
EUROPE 1789-1920, at 18, 270 (1920).
49. HAZEN, supra note 48, at 444.
50. Amos Perlmutter, Keeping Germany, and Europe, in Balance, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1989,
Metro Pt. 2, at 7.
51. Treaty of Bucharest, Mar. 10, 1913, available at http://www.historyofmacedonia.org/-
PartitionedMacedonia/Bucharest-html (last vistited Nov. 19, 2004); E. LIPSON, EUROPE IN THE XIXTH
& XXTH CENTURIES 1815-1939, at 278-80 (1940).
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much higher number of inhabitants (Italy, Turkey, and Romania).52 More-
over, Moldova's referendum on independence or union with Romania in
1994 was not considered as disrupting the balance in the region.53 Accord-
ing to Serbian President Vojislav Koshtunica, however, the independence
of Kosova and the consequent increase in the number of states in the Bal-
kans "would be fatal."'54 In contrast, Koshtunica considers the Serb entity in
Bosnia as "part of the family which is dear and close to [Serbia], temporar-
ily separated but always ours and in our hearts. ' 55 When asked by the Em-
bassy of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia to confirm the radical
statement, Dragan Marsicanin, Deputy Chairman of Kostunica's Democ-
ratic Party of Serbia and head of his election headquarters, said that "unifi-
cation was a long-term and historical interest of the Serb people." 56
C. The Principle of Nationality
One of the main principles that has contributed to the creation of new
states is the "principle of nationality," which was introduced by the famous
Italian jurist Pasquale Mancini in 1851. 57 According to Mancini, every
nation-a group of people united by common factors such as: territory;
race; language; history; tradition; customs; aspirations; and in particular, a
feeling of common belonging-is free to organize itself into an independ-
ent state. 58 Mancini's ideas were enthusiastically adopted by German, Ital-
ian, and Polish authors, as well as authors from Central Europe, who
recognized the right of each nation to create an independent state and to
52. The CIA World Factbook provides estimates of population and ethnic group sizes for each
country as of June 2004, The population of Albania is 3,544,808, the population of Albanians in Serbia
and Montenegro is 16.5% of 10,825,900 (1,786,274), and the population of Albanians in Macedonia is
25.2% of 2,071,210 (521,945). The population of Greece is 10,647,529, the population of Bulgaria is
7,517,973, and the population of Serbia and Montenegro minus Ethnic Albanians is 9,039,626. The
population of Italy is 58,057,477, the population of Turkey is 68,893,918, and the population of Roma-
nia is 22,355,551. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2004), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.
53. Paul Hockenos, Where the Mighty Have Fallen, Modest Moldova Stands Tall, CItRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Dec. 10, 1996, at 6.
54. When asked whether he foresaw independence for Kosova, Vojislav Kostunica's reply was,
"Not as long as we live." Landmark Kosava Talks Bring Little Hope for Early Resolution, WORLD
MARKETS ANALYSIS, Oct. 15, 2003, available in LexisNexis AllNews Database and on file with the
Chicago-Kent Law Review; Kostunica, Skopje, Mar. 5, 2004; KOHA DITORE, Mar. 6, 2004.
55. Weekly Roundup for Serbia, 7-13 September 2002, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Sept. 14,
2002, available in LexisNexis AllNews Database and on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review;
DNEVNI AVAZ, Sept. 13, 2002; KOHA DITORE, Sept. 14, 2002.
56. Id.
57. ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 13 (1995); CHARLES ROUSSEAU,
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 86 (Barcelona 1966).
58. ARTHUR K. KUHN, COMPARATIVE COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OR
CONFLICT OF LAWS 14-15 (1937).
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freely decide on its own fate. 59 Later on, the term "principle of nationality"
was replaced with the term "self-determination." According to this princi-
ple, a national group that lives within a certain territory has the right to
decide, through plebiscite, whether it wants to join another state or stay
within the state of which it has previously been a part. In other words, the
people have the right to decide on the future of the territory.
60
D. The Uti Possidetis Principle
The uti possidetis juris principle refers to the inviolability of previous
administrative borders. 6 1 This principle was first applied in Latin America
when the new sovereignties of the region decided to recognize the former
colonial administrative borders in order to solve or avoid border disputes.
62
Many Latin American states incorporated the uti possidetis principle into
their constitutional law, and the principle was applied during later divi-
sions. 63 Most of the African states that won their independence in the 1960s
also accepted the uti possidetis principle, as did the Organization of African
Unity.64
The Badinter Commission, in reference to former Yugoslavia, stated
that uti possidetis "is today recognized as a general principle" and that this
"principle applies all the more readily."'65 A Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe statement of October 10, 1991, announced that the
member states would "never ... recognize any changes of border, whether
external or internal, brought about by force."1
66
59. LUJ LE FIR, MEDJUNARODNO JAVNO PRAVO [INTERNALTIONAL PUBLIC LAW] 49-57 (Belgrade
1934); MARSEL MOA, OSNOVNI POJMOVI MEDJUNARODNOG JAVNOG PRAVA [THE BASIC IDEAS OF
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW] 36-38 (Belgrade 1925); RAMON DE ORUE, MANUAL DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 179-81 (Madrid 1933); ROUSSEAU, supra note 57, at 84-88.
60. MAREK ST. KoROWICz, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 283 (1964).
61. Enver Hasani, Uti Possidetis Juris: From Rome to Kosova, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 85,
85 (Fall 2003).
62. EDUARDO AUGUSTO GARCIA, MANUAL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 295 (Buenos
Aires 1975); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 669-70 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992); PETER RADAN, TI-E BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 69-134
(2002); ROUSSEAU, supra note 57, at 260; 1 MANUEL DIEZ DE VELASCO VALLEJO, INSTITUCIONES DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 260 (Madrid 1973); Hasani, supra note 61, at 86.
63. RADAN, supra note 62, at 89-91.
64. Organization of African Unity Resolution on Border Disputes, July 21, 1964, OAU Doc.
AHG/Res. 16(l), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS 360, 361 (Ian Brownlie ed.,
1971).
65. JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMNATION 140 (2000) (quoting
Badinter Commission Opinion No. 3).
66. INST. OF INT'L POLITICS & ECONS., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CHANGED YUGOSLAVIA
79 (Belgrade 1995).
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E. The Ethnic Principle
The ethnic principle is a more specific instance of the nationality prin-
ciple. It emphasizes the common ethnicity of a group that has nationalist
aspirations. Ethnicity is distinct from other factors that may animate na-
tionalism, such as common language.
F. The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination
1. The Subjects of the Right to Self-Determination
Many international acts that refer to the right of self-determination in-
sist on the fact that this right belongs to "peoples."'67 Mancini, under whose
influence the principle of self-determination was affirmed, considered na-
tions as the main subject of international law and the right of self-
determination.68 Lenin, too, wrote about the right of nations to self-
determination.69 Wilson, the Atlantic Charter, and the U.N. Charter used
the term "peoples" to determine the subjects of the right to self-
determination.70 In a number of acts, however, "peoples and nations" are
mentioned together.71 Lenin recognized nationalities as a subject of self-
determination in addition to peoples and nations. 72 This terminological
confusion raises the need to define the terms "people," "nation," and
"nationality."
67. See, e.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625(XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514(XV), U.N. GAOR,
15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doe. A/4684 (1960); International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Covenant on Economic Rights];
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinaf-
ter Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
68. CASSESE, supra note 57, at 13.
69. See generally V.I. LENIN, THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION: SELECTED
WRITINGS (1951).
70. U.N. CHARTER art. 1; Atlantic Charter, Aug. 14, 1941, U.S.-U.K., 55 Stat. 1603, 204 L.N.T.S.
382; WOODROW WILSON, WILSON'S ADDRESS TO CONGRESS, STATING THE WAR AIMS AND PEACE
TERMS OF THE UNITED STATES, DELIVERED IN JOINT SESSION, Point 7, 10 (Jan. 8, 1918), reprinted in I
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 464, 469 (Albert Shaw ed., 1924) [hereinafter
WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS].
71. The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination, G.A. Res. 637(VII)A, U.N. GAOR,
7th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952); Inclusion in the International Covenant or
Covenants on Human Rights of an Article Relating to the Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination, G.A.
Res. 545(VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th sess., Supp. No. 20, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952); Draft Interna-
tional Covenant on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation: Future Work on the Commission
on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 421(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th sess., Supp. No. 20, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950).
72. CASSESE, supra note 57, at 16; LENIN, supra note 69, at 87-90.
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For many authors, the most frequently used term, "people," is am-
biguous or vague. Most often, this term means people who live within the
same state (usually it denotes all of the citizens) or people organized into a
state. 73 Thus, it can imply individuals who are of different races and relig-
ions and who speak different languages. These differences demonstrate that
the term "people" is a legal rather than a natural category. 74 According to
another definition the term, "people" means a nation that is not politically
organized, a social group without a government, or a social group governed
by a people that does not belong to that social group. 75
The term "nation" has a number of different meanings. On some occa-
sions it has been used as a synonym for "state," for example, in the names
"League of Nations" and "United Nations." Usually, however, the term
means a natural society of men that differs from all the others by race, lan-
guage, religion, aspirations, territory, tradition, arts, and customs. 76
Mancini stressed the importance of language for the existence of a nation
as evidence of the moral unity of the nation-language, along with the will
to live together, is the most powerful of all bonds that constitute the na-
tional idea.77 Since Mancini, a nation has been defined as a blood union of
people who share the same language, religion, and historical tradition, or as
a group of people with the same origin, tradition, customs, and
aspirations. 78
The nation is a group that is established through historical evolution
and is comprised of individuals who speak the same language, have the
same culture, and live in the same territory.79 To Cavaglieri, the nation was
not a primordial and ethnographic product but a psychological and histori-
cal one. 80 Thus, a number of authors do not define the term nation based on
ethnologic criteria (territory, language, religion, and culture) but on spiri-
tual criteria (the existence of a common consciousness of the group mem-
73. 1 HILDEBRANDO AccIOLY, TRATADO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PI(BLICO 89 (1945);
HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966); HANS
KELSEN, PRINCIPIOS DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 196 (Buenos Aires 1965); GIORGIO DEL
VECCHIO, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 360 (Thomas Owen Martin trans., 1953).
74. KELSEN, supra note 73, at 196-97.
75. KOROWICZ,supra note 60, at 287.
76. PASQUALE FIORE, DEFINICIONI I MAMIANIT [THE DEFINITION GIVEN BY MAMIANI] 186 (n.d.).
77. KOROWICZ, supra note 60, at 291.
78. 1 AccIOLY, supra note 73, at 89 (citing THOMAS J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 n. 1 (7th ed. 1928)).
79. ISAAC PAENSON, MANUAL OF THE TERMINOLOGY OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (LAW OF
PEACE) AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 2-3 (1983).
80. 1 ACCIOLY, supra note 73, at 90.
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bers, i.e. the members comprise a separate group that is different from simi-
lar groups). 8 1
Members of the same nation share the same language, religion, and
territory. Nations are constituted by factors, which must not be confused
with the state itself or a group of individuals known as a people. Its main
element is the subjective factor represented through national consciousness.
Thus, a nation is a moral union, whereas the state is a political one.
8 2
These factors have contributed to the creation of national states. How-
ever, this was not always the case. Italy and Germany have unified, but the
Arab nations have not. Despite sharing the same language, religion, history,
and customs, Arab nations were divided in many states. A common lan-
guage, furthermore, does not necessarily lead to the unification of its
speakers. Englishmen and Americans speak the same language but do not
belong to the same nation. Finally, there are people who speak different
languages but declare themselves to belong to the same nation, for exam-
ple, the citizens of the United States. Taking into consideration such coun-
terexamples, Ernest Renan, historian and philosopher, contended that race,
religion, language, state, civilization, or economic interests do not create
nations but that "[t]he nation is a soul, a spirit, a spiritual family, founded
on a heroic past, great men, common glory; common experience... soli-
darity founded on the consciousness of sacrifices made in the past and on
the willingness to make further ones in the future."
8 3
The term "nationality" defines a group of people who share the same
territory, past, language, and culture and who have a common goal for lib-
eration and self-determination. 84 The 1974 Constitution of the SFRY re-
garded nations and nationalities as equals. Article 245 stressed, "[tihe
nations and nationalities of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
shall have equal rights."'85 A similar provision ensured linguistic equality as
well. 86
Usually peoples and nations are recognized as a subject of the right to
self-determination. However, some consider nations as the main subject of
81. ROusSEAU, supra note 57, at 85-86.
82. 1 ACCIOLY, supra note 73, at 89-90.
83. KOROWICZ, supra note 60, at 290.
84. D.B. Levin, Princip Samoopredelenija nacij v mezdunarodnom prave [The Principle of Self-
Determination of Nations in International Law], SOVETSKIJ EZEGODNIK MEZDUNARODNOGO PRAVA
[SOVIET ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 25, 36 (1962).
85. SOCIALIST FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONST. art. 245, reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA
THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 229.
86. Id. at art. 246 ("The languages of the nations and the nationalities and their alphabets shall be
equal throughout the territory of Yugoslavia.").
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the right to self-determination. 87 In uninational states, nations can decide
whether to remain a single nation or to join another state. In multinational
states, nations can decide to secede and create an independent state or to
join other nations in other multinational states. 88
2. The Emergence of the Principle of Self-Determination
The principle of self-determination is one of the most important prin-
ciples of international law. It was formulated under the influence of the
doctrine of "natural rights" and is associated with the period of transition
between feudalism and capitalism, when the bourgeoisie sought the affir-
mation of national sovereignty and the creation of independent states. This
process implied that the people possessed the right to determine the politi-
cal order and status of the state. Scholars disagree as to the exact origin of
the principle of self-determination. 89 In 1526, however, Francis I, the king
of France, stated that territories cannot be ceded against the will of the peo-
ple or "with[out] their explicit approval." 90 A few years later, regarding the
division of territories within the European continent, Henry IV, the king of
France from 1553 to 1610, stated that "I agree that the territories in which
the population speaks Spanish, should belong to Spain, whereas those
where the population speaks German, should belong to Germany, but the
territories where the population speaks French should belong to me." 9 1
The principle of self-determination was first applied at the end of the
eighteenth century when France used a plebiscite as a form of expressing
the collective will of the people and as a precondition for the transfer of
sovereignty over a certain territory from one state to another. 92 A plebiscite
is a vote by which the people of an entire country express an opinion for or
87. E.A. KOROVIN, S.B. KRYLOV & F.I. KOZHEVNIKOV, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL P(JBLICO 188
(Mexico 1963); 1 FEDOR IVANOVICH KOzHEvNIKOV ET AL., KURS MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA
[Course on International Law in Six Volumes] 152-55 (1967); 2 KOZHEVNIKOV ET AL., supra, at 202-
34; GRIGORtI I. TUNKIN, TEORIIA MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA [THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 8-
16, 78-79 (Moskva 1970); Levin, supra note 84, at 25-48; N.M. Minasyan, Leninskoe uchenie o
samoopredelenii i mezdunarodnoe pravo [Lenin's Teaching on Self-Determination of International
Law], in SOVETSKIJ EZEGODNIK MEZDUNARODNOGO PRAVA [Soviet Yearbook of International Law]
29-42 (1970).
88. 1 KOZHEVNIKOV ET AL., supra note 87, at 152-55; 2 KOZHEVNIKOV ET. AL, supra note 87, at
202-34.
89. Halim Moris, Self-Determination: An Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric, 4 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 201, 202 (1997).
90. 1 ACCIOLY, supra note 73, at 91.
91. RED. AKAD. V.P. POTEMKINA, PRVI SVEZAK, IZD. MATICA HRVATSKA, HISTORIJA
DIPLOMACIJE 177 (Zagreb 1951).
92. Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L
L. 539, 571 n. 164 (1992). These events cannot be called a true plebiscite, however, as the right of self-
determination applied only to those who voted pro-French. CASSESE, supra note 57, at 12.
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against a proposal, especially on a choice of government or ruler.93 Since
its first use in France, the plebiscite has become the most frequent means
for the determination of the will of the people, a means through which peo-
ple freely decide on the fate of a certain territory. A number of plebiscites
were organized in the nineteenth and twentieth century by the U.N.94
The first documents which contained the principle of self-
determination were the Declaration of Independence, the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and the Citizen, and the Declaration of Rights of the People
of Russia. According to the Declaration of Independence, adopted on July
4, 1776, governments derive their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned. Pursuant to this, people have the right to choose the form of gov-
ernment, including the right to alter or abolish it when it is not capable of
securing life, liberty, and happiness and the right to "dissolve the political
bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the
powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of
nature and of nature's God entitle them."95 The Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the Citizen confirms that power is "an expression of the common
will" and that "the nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty." 96 In
conformity with this, every nation has the right to freely determine its own
future. The Declaration of Rights of the People of Russia, adopted on No-
vember 15, 1917, confirmed: (1) the principle of equality and sovereignty
of the peoples of Russia, (2) the abolition of all national and religious privi-
leges, and (3) the right of the people to self-determination and the creation
of independent states.97
3. The Contributions of Lenin and Wilson to the Affirmation of the Prin-
ciple of Self-Determination
Apart from Pasquale Mancini, the greatest contributions to the affir-
mation of the principle of self-determination were provided by Vladimir
Lenin and Woodrow Wilson. WWI provided a chance to replace the old
international order-based on the oppression of many nations in Asia, Af-
93. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 891 (10th ed. 2001).
94. LouIs HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 285 (2d ed. 1987); 2
DIPLOMATICHESKII SLOVAR [DIPLOMATIC DICTIONARY] 553-54 (Moskva 1961).
95. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
96. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN arts. 3, 6 (1789), reprinted in
BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 8-9 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1971).
97. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA (1917), translated in MATERIALS
FOR THE STUDY OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM: STArE AND PARTY CONSTITUTIONS, LAWS, DECREES,
DECISIONS AND OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF THE LEADERS IN TRANSLATION 25-26 (James H. Meisel &
Edward S. Kozera eds., 2d rev. ed. 1953).
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rica, and Europe-with a better one that would ensure respect of the princi-
ple of self-determination.
WWI was justified by the hopes of many peoples for national libera-
tion from Austro-Hungary and Russia. These peoples demanded independ-
ence and national unification.98 Based on this, Lloyd George and Woodrow
Wilson propagated the national principle and worked for the liberation of
small nations and respect for the right of all nations for free development. 99
These efforts were in fact made to absorb the effects caused by both the
publication of the secret treaties-the London Treaty of April 16, 1915
(which contained a number of fatal provisions for Albania), and the Sikes-
Picot Treaty in 1916-and the calls by Lenin for self-determination. 10 0
Wilson, in his Fourteen Points Address, suggested that the readjust-
ment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected "along clearly recognizable
lines bf nationality" and that the relations of the Balkan states to one an-
other should be determined by "friendly counsel along historically estab-
lished lines of allegiance and nationality." 1 0 1
On February 11, 1918, Wilson introduced a new set of principles,
which essentially referred to the just solution of the national issue as one of
the most important issues for the creation of lasting peace. According to
Wilson:
1. peoples and provinces must not be bartered about from sover-
eignty to sovereignty, in a game, now forever discredited, of
the balance of power;
2. every territorial settlement must be made in the interest and
for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part
of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst ri-
val states; and
3. all well defined national aspirations must be accorded the ut-
most satisfaction. 102
On July 4, 1918, Wilson added to the previous proposals, insisting that
all issues, including territorial ones, must be solved based on the free will
of the populations concerned, which is equal to the right to self-
98. See CASSESE, supra note 57, at 20.
99. See id. at 24.
100. See PAUL JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES: THE WORLD FROM THE TWENTIES TO THE NINETIES 21-
23 (rev. ed. 1992).
101. WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS, supra note 70, at Point 9, 11.
102. WOODROW WILSON, PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADDRESS TO CONGRESS, ANALYZING GERMAN
AND AUSTRIAN PEACE UTTERANCES, DELIVERED IN JOINT SESSION (Feb. 11, 1918), reprinted in 1 THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 70, at 472, 477-78.
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determination. 103 The culmination of all this was the view expressed in his
speech in Billings, Montana, on September 11, 1919. Wilson stated:
The fundamental principle of [the League of Nation's Covenant] is a
principle never acknowledged before, a principle which had its birth and
has had its growth in this country: that the countries of the world belong
to the people who live in them, and that they have a right to determine
their own destiny and their own form of government and their own pol-
icy, and that no body of statesmen, sitting anywhere, no matter whether
they represent the overwhelming physical force of the world or not, has
the right to assign any great people to sovereignty under which it does
not care to live. 104
Accordingly, new states were to be created after the war that would be
homogenous and inhabited to the maximum extent by members of the same
nation. 105 These ideas were warmly greeted by the oppressed and divided
nations.
According to Lenin, recognition of a people's right to self-
determination is the key to a just solution of the national issue. 106 Thus,
Lenin insisted that every nation must enjoy the right to decide independ-
ently whether it will create its own state or join another state. 107 According
to Lenin, all nations, including those in multinational states, have the right
to secede and create independent states, as the right to self-determination
means the right to independence in a political sense, as well as the right to
create a national state. 108 Replying to those who claimed that the right to
self-determination promoted separatism and the creation of small states,
Lenin argued that nations sought this right only in cases when they were
subjected to national oppression. 109 According to Lenin, the denial of the
right to self-determination was nothing else but an effort to preserve the
privileges of the ruling nations. 110
103. WOODROW WILSON, FOUR FACTORS OF WORLD PEACE, ADDRESS AT MOUNT VERNON (July
4, 1918), reprinted in SELECTED ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 266, 268
(Albert Bushnell Hart ed., 1918).
104. CASSESE, supra note 57, at 20 (quoting WILSON'S IDEALS 109 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1942)).
105. ALFRED VERDROSS, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 42-44 (Antonio Truyol Y Serra
trans., 4th ed. 1974).
106. See LENIN, supra note 69, at 76.
107. See id.
108 See id. at 76-77.
109. See id
110. Id; 2 V.I. Lenin, Shenime kritike ne lidhje me Coshten komb~tare [Critical Remarks on the
National Question], in VEPRA TF ZOJEDHURA NE TRI VOLUME [SELECTED WORKS IN THREE VOLUMES],
23-57, 80-141, 721-30 (TiranE 1977) (originally published in volumes 10, 11, and 12 of
PROSVESHENIE in 1913); V.I. Lenin, SKICA E PAR E E TEZAVE PER (ESHTJEN NACIONALE DHE
KOLONIALE [PRELIMINARY DRAFT THESES ON THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTION] (June 1920);
2 V.I. Lenin, VEPRA TI ZGJEDHURA N DY VELLIME, VPLLIMI II [SELECTED WORKS IN Two VOLUMES]
708-14 (TiranZ 1958); V.I. Lenin, Mbi tj drejt.Yn e kombeve per vetevendosje [On the Right of Nations
to Self-Determinationl 4, 5, 6 PROSVESIENIE (April June 1914); V.I. Lenin, Detyrat e revolucionit
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Lenin has contributed to the recognition of the principle of self-
determination as one of the main principles of international law. In har-
mony with his views, Finland, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia
gained their independence between December 18, 1917, and December 22,
1918.111 During this period, Russia was ready to recognize the independ-
ence of the Ukraine, Crimea, and Georgia. 1' 2 The principle of self-
determination was confirmed with the Treaty of Friendship, signed be-
tween Russia and Persia on February 26, 1921,113 and the Treaty of Mos-
cow, signed between Russia and Turkey on March 16, 1921.114 The right of
the republics to secede from the USSR was recognized in the Constitutions
of 1924, 1936, and 1977.1.15 Of course, Lenin's embrace of the principle of
self-determination was subverted by his successors at the helm of the So-
viet Union, who viciously repressed separatist tendencies.
It must be stressed that there are significant differences between the
views presented by Lenin and Wilson. Despite the fact that both meant to
apply self-determination to Europe and the colonies, the American concep-
tion of how it should be extended to colonial countries was greatly quali-
fied by the need to take account of the interests of colonial powers. Wilson
stated:
A free, open minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial
claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determin-
ing all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations con-
cerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the
government whose title is to be determined.' 16
The wide gap between the two conceptions was apparent in the criti-
cisms of the Soviet views voiced by the American Secretary of State,
Robert Lansing, who wrote that Lenin's program menaced "the stability of
the future world by applying the self-determination principle to the colonial
world."117 According to Lansing, "however justified may be the principle
of local self-government, the necessities of preserving an orderly world
[The Tasks of the Revolution] 20, 21 RABOCI PUT (Oct. 9 & 10, Sept. 26 & 27, 1917). The above-
mentioned are articles that can be found in Lenin's works published in Russian (in Moscow).
111. J.A.S. GRENVILLE, A HISTORY OF THE WORLD IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 128-29(1994).
112. JOHNSON, supra note 100, at 74.
113. Treaty of Friendship Between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, Feb.
26, 1921, Persia-Russ., 9 L.N.T.S. 401, 403, 405. In the Treaty of Friendship, the Bolsheviks agreed to
withdraw all troops from Persia and turn over all Russian property in Persia to Persia.
114. Treaty of Moscow, Mar. 16, 1921, Russ.-Turk., 118 B.F.S.P. 990. In the Treaty of Moscow,
the Turkish government ceded Batuim to Soviet Russia in return for Soviet recognition of Turkish
sovereignty over Kars and Ardahan.
115. G. Alan Tarr, Creating Federalism in Russia, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 689, 693-95 (1999);
Minasyan, supra note 87, at 29, 31-32.
116. WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS, supra note 70, at Point 5.
117. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 132 (1986).
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require that there should be a national authority with sovereign rights to
defend and control the communities within the national boundaries.""l 8
There are also differences regarding another very important aspect of
the right to self-determination. While Lenin insisted on a right to self-
determination that included the right to secede and to create independent
states, the American concept, which is widely supported in the West, tries
to confine the right to self-determination to the so-called "internal self-
determination." 119 According to internal self-determination, people have
the right to determine their social and political status but cannot decide on
their international status. In other words, internal self-determination does
not include the right to secede and create an independent state, the right to
secede and join another state, or the right to secede and join a state, part of
which a people has been, but with a different status, for example, as part of
a federation or an autonomous unit.120 Internal self-determination confers
on a people the right to choose their social and political order and is har-
monious with the widely accepted views in the West, where self-
determination is synonymous with self-government and the right to democ-
ratically elect one's government.121
4. The Affirmation of the Principle of Self-Determination During WWII
Between WWI and WWII, the right to self-determination was a politi-
cal concept that was not yet recognized as a legal norm. 122 As early as
1941, the leaders of the antifascist coalition stated that putting the right to
self-determination into practice after the war was one of the main objec-
tives of the war. 123 The signatories of the Atlantic Charter proclaimed that
they:
1. desired to see no territorial changes that did not accord with
the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
2. respected the right of all peoples to choose the form of gov-
ernment under which they want to live; and
118. Id.
119. CASSESE, supra note 57, at 21.
120. See Stephen Alvstad, Note, The Quebec Secession Issue, With an Emphasis on the "Cultural"
Side of the Equation, 18 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 89, 99 n.90 (2004) (explaining distinction).
121. CASSESE, supra note 57, at 21; Zejnullah Gruda, E drejta e vetvendosjes (Paraqitja, zhvillimi,
qshtjet aktuale) [The Right to Self-Determination (Introduction, Evolution, Current Issues)],
Presentation of Paper at Conference hosted by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia,
Conference, The Right to Self-Determination in International Law: The Case of Kosova, November 21-
22, 1998.
122. CASSESE, supra note 57, at 4.
123. Id at 37.
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3. wished to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to
those who had been forcibly deprived of them. 124
Through a Declaration by the United Nations, which was adopted on
January 1, 1942, twenty-six states subscribed to the common program of
purposes and principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter. 125 Thereafter, the
principle of self-determination established itself as the main consideration
in the solution of the colonial problem, and many oppressed nations and
nations under colonial rule joined the antifascist movement, convinced that
the end of the war would bring the fulfillment of their ideals. 126
According to Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, one of the
main objectives of the U.N. is "[t]o develop friendly relations among na-
tions based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples."' 127 Respect for equal rights and the self-
determination of peoples are seen as necessary for peaceful and friendly
relations among nations. 128 The Charter requires the members of the U.N.,
who have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories
whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government, "to
take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist
them in the progressive development of their free political institutions."' 129
The Charter proclaims that one of the main objectives of the trusteeship
system is "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational ad-
vancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive
development towards self-government or independence as may be appro-
priate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and
the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."'1 30 The above-
mentioned created the legal basis for the liberation of oppressed peoples
and peoples under colonial rule.
Nonetheless, the right of peoples to self-determination continued to be
disputed. This can be proven by the fact that the principle of self-
determination was not incorporated into the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (due to opposition from colonialist states). 13 1 Since 1952, how-
ever, many resolutions of the General Assembly of the U.N. address the
124. Atlantic Charter, supra note 70.
125. Declaration by United Nations, Jan. 1, 1942, 55 Stat. 1600, 204 L.N.T.S. 382.
126. CASSESE, supra note 57, at 4.
127. U.N. CHARTER art. 1 para. 2.
128. Id. at art. 55.
129. Id. at art. 73.
130. Id. at art. 76.
131- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. pt. 1, at
71, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948).
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principle of self-determination. The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-
Determination called upon all states to promote the realization of that right
in relation to the peoples of non-self-governing territories and trust territo-
ries. 132 The Resolution states that "the right of peoples and nations to self-
determination is a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental
human rights."' 133 Resolution 523 states that developing countries "have the
right to determine freely the use of their natural resources."1t 34 Since the
adoption of the U.N. Charter, colonialism represents a flagrant violation of
the principles of freedom, equality, sovereignty, and self-determination.
Another step towards the liberation of peoples came with the adoption
of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and PeoplesI 35-traditionally known as the Magna Carta of decoloniza-
tion. 136 The Declaration stated that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-
determination.., and [to] freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development" and called for:
[i]mmediate steps.., in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all
other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all
powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or res-
ervations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire,
without any distinction as to race, creed or color, in order to enable them
to enjoy complete independence and freedom. 13 7
The Declaration also called for a cease to "[a]ll armed action or repressive
measures... directed against dependent peoples... in order to enable
them to exercise ... their right to complete independence."' 138
An article on the right of peoples to self-determination was included in
both International Covenants on Human Rights:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.
132. G.A. Res. 637(VII)A, supra note 71, at 26.
133. Id; UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 54 (1988)
[hereinafter U.N. ACTION IN HUMAN RIGHTS].
134. Integrated Economic Development and Commerical Agreements, GJ.A. Res. 523(V1), U.N.
GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952); U.N. ACTION IN HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 133, at 68.
135. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 67, at 66-67; U.N. ACTION IN HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 133, at
55.
136. AURELIU CRISTEsCU, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT
DEVELOPMENT ON THE BASIS OF UNITED NATIONS INSTRUMENTS at 9, para. 48, U.N. Doe.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XIV.3 (1981); JOSE A. PASTOR RIDRUEJO, CURSO DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO Y RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES 283 (Madrid 6th ed. 1996).
137. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 67, at67.
138. Id.
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2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its
own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provi-
sions of the Charter of the United Nations.13 9
One of the most important steps towards the legalization of the right to
self-determination was made through the adoption of the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States.140 In the Declaration, the principle of self-
determination of peoples is equal to the principle that States shall refrain
from the threat or use of force, the principle of sovereign equality of States,
and the principle that States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations as-
sumed by them. Thus, every possibility for the denial of the legal value of
the right of peoples to self-determination is eliminated, while at the same
time the existing international legal order is not disputed. 14 1 The Declara-
tion proclaims that "all peoples have the right freely to determine.., their
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment" and calls upon states to respect this right. 142 According to the Decla-
ration, the "subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and
exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle [of self-determination],
as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the
Charter [of the United Nations]."' 143 According to the Declaration, the
modes of implementing the right to self-determination are "[t]he establish-
ment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integra-
tion with an independent State, or the emergence into any other political
status freely determined by a people." 144 The Declaration calls upon States
to refrain from any forcible action that deprives peoples of their right to
self-determination, freedom, and independence, and authorizes peoples to
seek and receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of
the Charter.1 45
139. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, supra note 67; Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, art. 1, supra note 67.
140. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 67; U.N. ACTION IN HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 133, at 55.
141. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 67.
142. Id. at 123.
143. Id. at 124.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 122.
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The right of self-determination was reiterated in the Helsinki Final
Act, which states that:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine,
when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, with-
out external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural development. 146
The incorporation of this right in the Helsinki Final Act shows that the right
lies not only with the peoples under colonial rule, but with all the peoples
and countries of the world.
5. The Positive Effects of Self-Determination
The principle of self-determination was the driving force behind the
realization of the national aspirations of many peoples throughout the
world in their struggle for freedom, independence, and national unification.
This can be proven by the impressive number of states and peoples that
gained independence during the last 150 years (more than one hundred
gained independence after WWII).147 This is a sign of the U.N.'s success in
promoting the realization of the right to self-determination. The fact that
even today there are multinational states that have centralist systems that
oppose the right to self-determination cannot change the prevailing attitude
that the right of peoples to self-determination is one of the fundamental
human rights.
Thus, it is not surprising that the following is written in a very famous
book on international law:
The "open" community of today, replacing the "closed" community of
earlier times, owes this essential characteristic to the self-determination
of peoples. The right of peoples to self-determination has become the in-
strument, the key and the tool of an open society. Thus self-
determination is in a sense a precondition for the very existence of this
type of international community. In other words, this principle is the
prior condition which has enabled international society to be what it is. It
thus determines the being and the essence of the present-day interna-
tional society. Hence, it is an essential, primary principle from which the
essence of the present-day international community derives. If there is no
self-determination, there is no present-day international community.
Thus, in the hierarchy of the norms of international law, self-
determination is an essential first and primary condition from which flow
146. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292,
1295 [hereinafter Helsinki Final Act].
147. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, FIELD LISTING: INDEPENDENCE
(2004), available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2088.html.
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the other principles governing the international community. Self-
determination thus belongs tojus cogens.14 8
Thus, the principle of self-determination is part of positive interna-
tional law andjus cogens.149
6. Inconsistencies Related to the Principle of Self-Determination
In practice, the question of whether the right to self-determination can
be used more than once is often asked. There are different views with re-
gard to this question. To unitary forces in multinational states, the right to
self-determination can be used only once. According to this view, the se-
cession of a federal unit, province, or a territory from a state, or its com-
plete disintegration, is not acceptable, even if this is done in accordance
with the will of people.
This issue was first raised during the adoption of the Soviet Constitu-
tion in 1936. In an address to the Congress of the U.S.S.R., Stalin opposed
the calls to remove article 17 from the draft of the Soviet Constitution,
which recognized the right of the republics to secede from the Union. 50
Stalin argued that the Soviet Union was a free union of republics; thus, the
denial of the right to secession would be a violation of the voluntary char-
acter of the Union. 15 1 Stalin stressed that, for the realization of the right of
peoples to self-determination, not only was the national factor important,
that is-the group had to comprise a compact majority, geographical fac-
tors were important as well. Stalin argued that only the republics which
were near the border had the right to self-determination, including
secession. 152
This issue was also discussed by the federal units of the SFRY from
the moment it became clear that the federation could not exist as such any
longer. The political authorities of the time, which had a unitary orienta-
tion, did their utmost to prevent any efforts for the reformation, democrati-
zation, or modernization of the multinational federation, alleging that the
148. INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 1184 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed.,
1991) (emphasis in original).
149. RIDRUEJO, supra note 136, at 288-89.
150. JOSEPH STALIN, REFERATI NE KONGRESIN VIII GJITHFEDERAL T SOVJET9VE, Nov. 25, 1936
[ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R.: REPORT DELIVERED AT THE EXTRAORDINARY
EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF THE U.S.S.R., Nov. 25, 1936], at 35 (1936); JOSIF STALJIN, PITANJA
LENJINIZMA [QUESTIONS OF LENINISM] 575-76 (Zagreb 1981).
151. STALIN, supra note 150, at 35; STALJIN, supra note 150, at 575-76.
152. STALIN, supra note 150, at 36-37; STALJIN, supra note 150, at 576-77.
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peoples that had joined the Yugoslav federation after WWII had already
used their right to self-determination.153
There were different views regarding this thesis. Ernest Petric argued
that all of the postwar Constitutions recognized the right of self-
determination for the peoples of Yugoslavia. 154 Professors Avramov and
Kreca from the Law Faculty in Belgrade argued that the Constitution of
1974 recognized the right to secession, but conditioned that recognition on
the consent of all the members of the federation, both republics and prov-
inces. 155 On the other hand, Miodrag Jovicic claimed that the peoples who
had joined the SFRY based on their free will had consumed the right to
self-determination, including the right to secession.1 56 In support of this
view, the latter stated that the right of the republics to secession was not
proclaimed in the normative part of the Constitution.157 In contrast, Branko
Horvat argued that those who decide voluntarily to join a certain entity can
also decide to separate from it. Horvat's analysis would apply to Kosova,
as the latter joined Serbia by the decision of its representatives in July
1945. Therefore, its representatives can decide to separate from Serbia. 158
Most international acts support the view that the right to self-
determination cannot be consumed; it can be used more than once. It is a
fundamental right without which people would not be able to enjoy other
rights. Many constitutions recognize the right to self-determination, includ-
ing secession. Further, international recognition of the independence of the
former Soviet and Yugoslav republics confirms the international commu-
nity's acceptance of the right of peoples to self-determination as a funda-
mental human right.
7. The Content of the Principle of Self-Determination
In international law, the right of self-determination means the right of
people to decide on their own political status (external self-determination)
and the right to determine freely by and for themselves their political, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural status (internal self-determination).
According to international acts external self-determination includes:
153. This view is supported by the constitutional scholarship of Serbia and Montenegro. See, e.g.,
MIODRAG JOVICIC, VELIKI USTAVNI SISTEMI (Beograd 1984).
154. Ernest Petric, Nadglasavanje slobodne voije. Rizik nametnutog ustava, BORBA, Mar. 15 & 16,
1988.
155. SMILJA AVRAMOV & MILENKO KRECA, MEDIJUNARODNO JAVNO PRAVO [PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW] 82 (Beograd 2001).
156. JovIcic,supra note 153.
157. Id. at 238.
158. BRANKO HORVAT, KoSOVSKO PITANJE [KOSOVA ISSUE] 92-93 (Zagreb 1988).
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1. the right of a people to secession or the establishment of a
sovereign and independent state;
2. the right of a people to secession and association with an in-
dependent state; and
3. the right of a people to unification with a state of which it has
been a part, but with alterative status, for example, as an
autonomous member of a federation.159
This was best interpreted by American Democrat Congressman Eliot
Engel, who in an interview stated:
I continue to remain convinced that the only solution for Kosova is the
right of its people for self-determination. If they want a Republic for
Kosova, their will must be respected; it they want union with Albania,
their will must be respected; if they want to remain in a confederation
equal to Serbia and Montenegro, their will must be respected again. The
political future of the Albanians of Kosova must be their own decision
and not that of Milosevic or the International Community. I strongly be-
lieve in self-determination for all peoples; therefore, Albanians deserve
the same destiny. 16 0
Internal self-determination includes:
I. the right of people to determine their political and social
regime;
2. the right of people to freely dispose of their natural resources
and pursue economic development; and
3. the right to solve all matters under domestic jurisdiction.16 1
In practice, out of all these forms of manifestation of the right of peo-
ples to self-determination, states were mainly opposed to the right to seces-
sion. In democratic countries, such problems were solved without great
difficulties, for example, in the cases of Norway and Sweden, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, and the breakup of the former Soviet Union. On the
other hand, in totalitarian, hegemonic, and imperialist countries, the efforts
of different peoples to secede were suppressed, for example, in the case of
former Yugoslavia.
In order to understand the problem properly, it must be stressed that
the calls for self-determination are provoked by the nature of certain re-
gimes and the relations in multinational states. According to Paine, Amer-
ica proves that even in countries where no harmony is expected because of
159. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 67.
160. ZtRi, Oct. 25, 1997.
161. CRISTESCU, supra note 136, at 20-25, para. 113-65; HtCTOR GROS ESPIELL, THE RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS at 22-28, para. 113-65,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.79.XIV.5 (1980); Levin, supra note 84, at 29-
31.
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their national composition and the multitude of languages and religions, all
parties can create a sincere alliance through a government based on social
principles and human rights. 162 Lenin stressed that there is no national issue
in Switzerland and no tendency for secession despite the fact that it is a
heterogeneous state (as far as its ethnic composition and linguistic differ-
ences are concerned). 163
11I. PLEBISCITE OR REFERENDUM AS A MEANS TO EXPRESS THE WILL OF
THE PEOPLE
The will of the people was first mentioned after the signing of the
Treaty of Madrid in 1526.164 There, the king of France stated that territorial
changes could take place only with the consent of the inhabitants. 165 In
literature, such views were first presented by the Dutch jurist, Hugo
Grotius. According to the latter, "Just as, in fact, there are many ways of
living, one being better than another, and out of so many ways of living
each is free to select that which he prefers, so also a people can select the
form of government which it wishes."'166 Grotius stated that the consent of
the people was a fundamental issue. 167 Such views were supported by other
authors as well. According to I.K. Bluncli, in order to legalize territorial
acquisitions it is necessary to have the consent of the people. 168 In 1940,
Hackworth stated that "[t]he consent of the population of ceded territory is
not essential for the validity of the cession" but added that "in recent years
cessions of territory have frequently been conditioned upon the will of the
people as expressed in plebiscite."' 169
After WWI, the plebiscite became the most important institution for
the recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination. A plebiscite
162. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 367 (Moncure D. Conway ed., New York & London, G.P.
Putnam's Sons 1894); TOMAS PEJN, PRAVA COVEKA 203 (Beograd 1987).
163. Vladimir ll'ich Lenin, Shinime kritike ne lidhje me Ceshten kombdtare [Critical Remarks on
the National Question], in VEPRA TF ZGJEDHURA N8 TRI VELLIME, VELLIMI II [2 SELECTED WORKS IN
THREE VOLUMES] supra note 110, at 24-25, 45-47.
164. I AciOLY, supra note 73, at 91.
165. Id.
166. 1 HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES [ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE]
104 (James B. Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oceana Publications 1964) (1925); see also 2
GROTIUS, supra, at 261.
167. Id.
168. I.K. BLUNCLI, SOVREMENOE MEZDUNARODNOE PRAVO CIVILIZOVANIH GOSUDARSTV,
IZLOZENO V VIDE KODEKSA 187-89 (Moskva 1877); B.M. Klimenko, Mezdunarodno pravovoja priroda
goosudarstvenoj territorii [International Legal Nature of the State Territory], SOVETSKIJ EZEGODNIK
MEZDUNARODNOGO PRAVA 195 (1968).
169. 1 GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 422 (1940); HENKIN, supra note
94, at 3 10.
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facilitates the right of the people to vote on the status of the territory in
which they live. 170 Plebiscite is a means to determine the will of the people.
It can be based on an internal act, on the decision of an international or-
ganization, or envisaged in an international treaty.171 After WWII, this
principle became a constitutive part of the most important documents of the
time. According to the Helsinki Final Act, "all peoples always have the
right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal
and external political status." 172
In practice, plebiscites have been employed on a number of occasions,
including in Togo, Cameroon, Rwanda-Burundi, Western Samoa, French
Polynesia, and East Timor.173 Yet, there are also cases when a plebiscite
was disputed or sabotaged. The plebiscite in Kashmir could not be held due
to obstruction from India. 174 Similarly, Polisario opposed an OAU-
proposed referendum in Western Sahara, insisting on the fact that the peo-
ple of Sahara had already used the right to self-determination. 175 Polisario's
remarks could have been based on the view that the National Liberation
Movement, rather than referendum, is the authentic manifestation of the
will of the people. 176 Justice Ammon, of the International Court of Justice,
stated that nothing shows the will for emancipation more clearly than the
efforts undertaken in that direction together with the risk and immense
sacrifices such a struggle entails, adding, "[t]he struggle is more decisive
than a referendum, being absolute sincere and authentic."' 177 The United
Nations has also recognized that liberation movements are authentic repre-
sentatives of the lawful aspirations of a people for liberation and gave them
observer status at the U.N. 178
The above-mentioned illustrates that the will of the people and plebi-
scite have become part of international law. For example, England, in rela-
tion to Gibraltar during the 1960s, insisted that it would not enter into any
arrangements on the basis of which the people of Gibraltar would be put
under the sovereignty of another state, against their freely and democrati-
cally expressed will. 179 Therefore, in 1967, the U.K. organized a referen-
170. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 93, at 891.
171. See generally Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, The "Requirement" of Plebiscite in Territorial
Rapprochement, 12 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 23 (1989).
172. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 146, at 1295.
173. Rudrakumaran, supra note 171, at 31.
174. Id. at 30.
175. Id. at 31,45.
176. Id. at 45.
177. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 33, 100 (Oct. 16) (Advisory Opinion).
178. Rudrakumaran, supra note 17 1, at 45.
179. See CASSESE, supra notc 57, at 210.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
dum, in which the people of Gibraltar declared themselves in favor of
maintaining their ties with Britain.'8 0 This stance was incorporated in the
Constitution of Gibraltar. 18 1 England held a similar position in relation to
the Falklands. According to the British, "it is upon the islanders to deter-
mine what their ultimate constitutional status shall be," adding that the
Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples states that "those wishes
should be paramount."'1 82
Such a stance was reinforced during the last decade of the twentieth
century when the U.K. expressed its readiness to recognize the legitimacy
of "whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of
Northern Ireland with regard to its status." 183 Until a final settlement was
reached, Northern Ireland would be considered part of the U.K., that is-it
would remain part of the U.K. as long as this reflected the democratic will
of the majority of the population. 184 The New Framework for Agreement,
which was a joint paper of the British and Irish Governments, emphasized
that the two governments "take as guiding principles for their co-operation
in search of this agreement the principle of self-determination as set out in
the Joint Declaration" and that:
the British Government recognise[s] that it is for the people of Ireland
alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without ex-
ternal impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the ba-
sis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring
about a united Ireland, if that is their wish; the Irish Government ac-
cept[s] that the democratic right of self-determination by the people of
Ireland as a whole must be achieved and exercised with and subject to
the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern
Ireland. 185
This principle was reaffirmed by the U.N. through General Assembly
and Security Council resolutions after the invasion of East Timor in De-
cember 1975.186 The U.N. called for Indonesia's withdrawal from East
180. Id. at 208. The result of the referendum was that 12,138 wanted Gibraltar to remain in associa-
tion with the U.K.; 44 wanted it to become a part of Spain. Id.
181. Id. at 210.
182. Rudrakumaran, supra note 171, at 43.
183. Agreement Reached in Multi-party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, U.K.-N. Ir.-Ir., available at
http://www.ucc.ie/celt/published/E900003-006/ (also known as the Multi-party Agreement, the Good
Friday Agreement, and the Belfast Agreement).
184. Id; Ibrahim Berisha, Politika angleze dhe shqiptaret [British Policy and Albanians], BOTA
SOT, Feb. 7, 1996.
185. A New Framework for Agreement, Feb. 22, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 946, 948, 949-50.
186. Question of Timor, G.A. Res. 3485(XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 118,
U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th sess., 1869th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/11915
(1975).
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Timor and for all states to allow the people of East Timor to decide their
future. 187 A similar view was expressed by Dr. Klaus Hens, the Vice-
Chairman of the European Parliament, when he stated that, "the status of
Kosova must be sought through a referendum under international
supervision.", 88
A plebiscite was organized in Puerto Rico on July 23, 1967, based on
an internal act, through which the voters were to decide on the final politi-
cal status of Puerto Rico.189 A vote for the Commonwealth would mean
"reaffirmation of the Commonwealth, the inviolability of Puerto Rican
United States citizenship, the authorization to develop the Commonwealth
to a maximum of self-government, and the permanence of the Puerto Rico-
United States relationship."' 190 A vote for statehood would mean "the au-
thorization to ask the Congress of the United States of America to admit
Puerto Rico as a federated state of the American Union," whereas a vote
for independence would mean "the authorization to ask Congress for the
independence of Puerto Rico from the United States of America." 191 In
1967, the Commonwealth option attracted a majority vote. 192
A second plebiscite was held in 1993, based on numerous bills on the
status of Puerto Rico that the U.S. Congress considered in 1989, 1990, and
1991, implicitly authorizing plebiscite for the future political status of
Puerto Rico. 193 Puerto Ricans choose among three options: independence,
citizenship, or a Commonwealth. None of the options won more than 50%
of the votes. 194
In 1961, Austria called for the consideration of the problem of South
Tyrol in the General Assembly of the United Nations, insisted on "com-
plete autonomy" for the province of Bozen, and underlined that a just solu-
tion for this problem could be achieved only through the application of the
principle of self-determination. 195
187. D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (3d ed. 1983).
188. NASABORBA, Feb. 17-18, 1996.
189. Jesis G. Romdn, Comment, Does International Law Govern Puerto Rico's November 1993
Plebiscite?, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 98, 112-13 (1995).
190. Id. at 113.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 98.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195 CASSESE, supra note 57, at 105
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IV. THE MAIN PREMISES FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE FINAL STATUS OF
KOSOVA
The efforts for the solution of the final status of Kosova must be based
on two premises: (1) the full respect of the principles of law and justice and
(2) the rejection of the use of force, which is incompatible with the rules of
international law. Additionally, an important role must be played by (1) the
uti possidetis principle (Kosova was a separate part of the Yugoslav federa-
tion, with clearly defined borders) and (2) the ethnic principle. Solutions
that do not respect the right of peoples to self-determination are not just or
sustainable as the right of peoples to self-determination is a prerequisite to
the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights. 196
A. The Principle of Legitimacy
The principle of legitimacy is problematic for advocates of the inde-
pendence for Kosova because Serbia has not consented to it. 197 This princi-
ple is nothing but a reactionary effort to prevent the self-determination of
peoples who fight against tyranny. 198 If the consent of Serbia had been
required, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia should
have been denied their right to independence. It is unrealistic to expect that
Serbia will consent to the independence of Kosova. Kosova and its people
have the right to be free regardless of Serbia's position. The only apparent
basis for such a power depends on an interpretation of the 1974 Constitu-
tion, according to which Kosova was a constitutive unit of the federation of
free and equal nations and nationalities and had equal rights with the
republics.
B. The Uti Possidetis Principle as Applied to Kosova
The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution recognized the "autonomy" of Kos-
ova, while also recognizing the power of other autonomous units within
Yugoslavia, called "republics," to secede. Accordingly, interpretation of
the 1974 Constitution is crucial to advocacy of independence for Kosova
under the principle of legitimacy.
196. G.A. Res. 637, supra note 71, at 26.
197. If at a future date, Serbia were to consent to Kosova's independence, that consent would
satisfy the principle of legitimacy.
198. JURAJ ANDRASSY, MEDJUNARODNO PRAVO [INTERNATIONAL LAW] 34, 66 (Zagreb 1971);
1 MILAN BARTOSH, MEDJUNARODNO JAVNO PRAVO [PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW] 184-85, 191, 213,
282 (Beograd 1954); ROUSSEAU, supra note 57, at 321.
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According to the Constitutions of 1974 (federal, republican, and pro-
vincial), Kosova was a constitutive element of the Yugoslav federation and
enjoyed equality with the other federal units.199 Evidence of this can be
seen from the Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kos-
ova of 1974, which enumerated Kosova's state attributes:
1. the right of the province to adopt and change its constitution;
2. the right to adopt laws;
3. the right to exercise constitutional judicial functions and to
have a constitutional court;
4. judicial autonomy and the right to have a Supreme Court;
5. the right to decide on changes of its territory;
6. the right to ratify treaties that were concluded with foreign
states and international bodies;
7. the right to have independent organs, such as a Parliament,
Presidency, and Executive Council (Government); and Minis-
tries such as the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Justice,
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.200
That Kosova was a constitutive element of the Yugoslav federation,
deserving of treatment equal to that of the other federal units, is supported
by the remarks of Stipe Mesic, the President of Croatia, who was the
chairman of the Yugoslav Presidency prior to its dissolution. During his
testimony in the trial against Milosevic at the Hague, Mesic stated that
"Vojvodina and Kosova were autonomous provinces and they were con-
stituent elements of the Federation, just like the six republics." 20 1 He added
that through the changes of the status of Kosova, which were done by force
and against the will of the people, the implementation of the project for the
creation of a greater Serbia began in the ruins of the Yugoslav federa-
tion.202 Furthermore, in 1991, Mesic had called upon the international
community to recognize the existing subjects of the Yugoslav federation,
including Kosova and Vojvodina. 20 3
199. SOCIALIST FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONST. art. 1, reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA
THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 225; YUGOSLAVIA REPUBLICS AND PROVINCES 170 (1979).
200. SOCIALIST AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF KosovA CONST. art. 301, 349, 372, 390, translated in
HELSINKI COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA, supra note 6, at 38,45.
201. Transcript, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, IC.T.Y., at T. t0516 (Oct. 1, 2002),
available at http://www. un.org/icty/transe54/02 1001 IT-htm; KOHA DITORE, Oct. 2, 2002.
202. Id. at T. 10522; KOHA DITORE, Oct. 2, 2002.
203. Stipe Mesic, at the Symposium organized by the Institute fur Ausvartige Beziehungen on
Franz Joseph Strauss, Nov., 17-19, 1991.
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According to the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia of 1974, the territories of its units were defined with "borders,"
which could not be altered without their consent.204 According to the Con-
stitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia of 1974, the "territory of an
autonomous province may not be altered without the consent of the provin-
cial assembly. '205 According to the Constitution of the Socialist Autono-
mous Province of Kosova of 1974, "[t]he territory of the Socialist
Autonomous Province of Kosova may not be altered without the consent of
the Provincial Assembly. '206 The Constitution of the SFRY uses the word
boundaries for the lines that divided the constitutive units of the federation
and did not make any distinction between republics and provinces. 207 A
publication of the (Yugoslav) Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs con-
firms that the uti possidetis principle should apply to Kosova: "the bounda-
ries of the province cannot be changed without the consent of the
assembly. '208 Application of the uti possidetis principle is based on the
rights and obligations contained in the aforementioned Constitutions.
The problem of borders, however, is complicated by the fact that the
Serbs see the independence of Kosova in the existing, administrative bor-
ders as a change of borders and a violation of the Helsinki principles. 209
The Albanians do not see this as a change of borders, as Kosova had its
borders similarly to the other units of the federation. To the Albanians, the
efforts of Serbia to keep Kosova within the Union of Serbia and Montene-
gro violate the uti possidetis principle from the aspects of both constitu-
tional and international law.
The problem of borders is also complicated by regional concerns. The
international community fears that the change of borders would have a
"domino effect" in the region. Further, Serbs state that the independence of
Kosova would open the issue of the Albanians in Macedonia and the
Presheva Valley as well as that of the Serbs in Bosnia. The Albanians,
however, consider that if Kosova is divided along ethnic lines then the
204. SOCIALIST FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONST. art. 5, reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA
THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 226.
205. SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SERBIA CONST. art. 292, translated in HELSINKI COMM. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS IN SERBIA, supra note 6, at 27, 33 35.
206. SOCIALIST AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF KoSOVA CONST. art. 3, translated in HELSINKI
COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA, supra note 6, at 41.
207. SOCIALIST FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONST. art. 5, reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA
THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 226.
208. FED. SECRETARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE SOCIALIST FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA,
ETHNIC ALBANIANS IN THE SFR OF YUGOSLAVIA 17 (Press, Information and Cultural Affairs Sector
Belgrade, Apr. 1989).
209. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 146, at 1294.
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same right can be requested by the Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia, the
Serbs in Bosnia, and the Bosnians in Sandjak.2 10
C. The Ethnic Principle
One of the most important principles to be taken into account during
the process for the determination of the final status of Kosova is the ethnic
principle. Applying the principle of ethnicity engenders controversy over
the ethnic makeup of Kosova.
Despite being multiethnic, Kosova has a population with an Albanian
majority. Albanians are a majority in all the municipalities of Kosova ex-
cept for Leposaviq. According to the census in 1981, the percentage of
Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosova was 14.7%.211 According to the 1991
census, boycotted by the Albanians, the total number of Albanians living in
Kosova was estimated at 1,607,000, comprising 81.6% of the popula-
tion.212 Albanians regard this figure as a clear underestimation. Another
publication in 1993 estimated that the population of Kosova consisted of
less than or approximately 2 million people, of whom 90% were Albani-
ans.2 13 According to the 1991 census, organized by the Serb authorities in
Kosova, the total number of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosova was
191,700, which comprised about 10% of the population.2 14 The Albanians
of Kosova together with the Albanians in Macedonia, Southern Serbia, and
Montenegro comprised the third largest ethnic group in former
Yugoslavia.2 15
A very important problem related to population data is the number of
displaced persons, an object of great dispute. In the Congress of the Social-
ist Party of Serbia in February 2000, a number of 350,000 displaced per-
sons, including 260,000 Serbs from Kosova, was mentioned.216 In the 53d
session of the United Nations High Commissariat for Refugees in 2002, the
210. Hivzi Islami, Which Are the Options for the Division of Kosova?, KOHA DITORE, Apr. 3,
2004; Tim Judah, Closing the Circle in Kosova, KOHA DITORE, Apr. 3, 2004; Augustin Palokaj, Serbia
Threatens Europe with a War in Bosnia ifKosova Becomes Independent, KOHA DITORE, Jan. 13, 2003;
Augustin Palokaj, Who Will Save Kosovafrom Being Divided?, KOHA DITORE, Mar. 8, 2004.
211. Dimitrije Bogdanovic, The Kosova Question-Past and Present, in KOsOVA 153 (Basil W.R.
Jenkins ed., 1992); ETHNIC ALBANIANS IN THE SFR OF YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 208, at 5.
212. RADAN, supra note 62, at 196.
213. CASSESE, supra note 57, at 268.
214. Steven Erlanger, Crisis in the Balkans: Belgrade; Diplomat Says Serbs Want Some Albanians
in Kosova, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, § 1, at 16.
215. INT'L HELSINKI FED'N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FROM AUTONOMY TO COLONIZATION: HUMAN
RIGHTS IN KOSOVA 1989-1993, at 1 (1993).
216. UNMIK Division of Public Information, Media Monitoring, Local Media Monitoring, What is
the Real Number of Serb IDPs from Kosova?, KoHA DITORE, July 30, 2003 (page references unavail-
able), available at http://www.unmik-online.org/press/2003/mon/Ju/lmm%20300703.htm.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
permanent representative of Serbia and Montenegro to the U.N. in Geneva,
Milorad Scepanovic, stated that the number of displaced persons in Serbia
is 290,000, of whom 260,000 are Serbs, which is much higher than the
number of Serbs who ever lived in Kosova. 217 Another foreign author lack-
ing reliable statistical data mentions a range of 150,000-300,000 internally
displaced persons ("IDPs") and adds that the number most frequently men-
tioned is 200,000 IDPs. 218 The latter adds that it is a deception to include
the Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia brought to Kosova by Milosevic in the
mid-1990s in the number of IDPs. 219 Such numbers continuously were
spread abroad to exaggerate the problem or to open up new possibilities for
colonization, as Milosevic attempted during the 1990s by bringing Serbs
from Krajina. Unfortunately, very frequently the victims of such manipula-
tion are internationals. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke on the need
for the return of 200,000 Serbs.220 Unfortunately, even the ICG, based on
information taken from the United Nations Human Commissioner for
Refugees, mentions in one of its own publications the number of 235,000
ethnic Serbs who allegedly left Kosova after the entry of KFOR.22 1
By any account, the dominant ethnic group in Kosova is Albanian.
The principle of ethnicity, applied to Kosova, thus supports independence.
D. The Principle of Self-Determination and the Albanian Issue in Former
Yugoslavia
The principle of self-determination has great support in scientific cir-
cles, democratic countries, and among peoples under foreign rule. It also
has great support among the Albanians, who had been severely affected by
the territorial divisions in the European continent. Many scholars, including
Serbs, recognize the latter. According to the Serb academician, Vladimir
Dedijer, "the interests of no nation were the object of such shameless bar-
gaining, in the peace conferences after WWI, as were the interests of the
217. Id.
218. Valur Ingimundarson, Pitting Democratic Standards Against Sovereign Rights: The Nature of
International Rule in Kosova, 8 NEW BALKAN POL.: J. POL. 21 (2003), available at http://www.new-
balkan-politics.org.mk/napis.asp?id=l 1 &lang-English
219. Id.
220. Putin Calls for "Consistent Efforts" in Bringing Peace and Order to the Balkans, BBC
MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Sept. 6, 2003, available in LexisNexis AllNews database and
on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review; KOHA DITORE, Sept. 8, 2003.
221. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, BALKANS REP. No. 134, FINDING THE BALANCE: TIlE SCALES OF
JUSTICE IN KOSOVA 24 (Sept. 12, 2002).
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Albanians. '222 Following the Berlin Congress and the Balkan Wars, many
territories that were inhabited by Albanians were cut off through borders
that were drawn by the great powers in total opposition to the principle of
nationality and the right to self-determination. 223 This fact is confirmed by
a number of Serb scholars who acknowledge that the annexation of Kosova
in 1913 by Serbia and Montenegro "was in opposition to the aspirations of
the Albanian people, which were expressed in the movement for national
liberation between 1878 and 1912."224 Similarly, in 1918 Albanians "op-
posed their incorporation in Serbia, respectively Yugoslavia." 225
The incorporation resulted in the division of the Albanian nation and
its territories in two. These facts were confirmed by Dimitrije Tucovi, who
stated that "half of the population of Albania was left within our new bor-
ders."' 226 This was the moment the Albanian problem was born, which has
ever since continued to be one of the gravest problems not only in the Bal-
kans but in Europe as well.
After WWI, the Albanians in Yugoslavia were treated as a national
minority but were deprived of all the rights envisaged by the system of the
League of Nations. They were subjected to brutal oppression and efforts at
assimilation, including killings, beatings, the burning of villages, confisca-
tion of property, and the banning of the use of the Albanian language. Kos-
ova was turned into a place of oppression that was threatened with the
"extermination of the Albanian population. '227 This was confirmed by
Josip Tito, former ruler of the SFRY, in an article published on December
16, 1942. In it, he branded Yugoslavia as a "country where nationa l oppres-
sion takes place" and painted the Albanians as an "oppressed nation sub-
jected to extermination. '228 Because of the oppression, the Albanians of
Kosova, Macedonia, and Montenegro laid their hopes with the principle of
self-determination.
222. 2 SRBIJA I ALBANCI: PREGLED POLITIKE SRBIJE PREMA ALBANCIMA OD 1913 DO 1945
GODINE 17 (Ljubljana 1989) (quoting VLADIMIR DEDIJER, JUGOSLAVIJA OD VERSAJA DO PARIZA
[YUGOSLAVIO FROM VERSAILLES TO PARIS] 24 (Belgrade 1947)).
223. HAZEN, supra note 48, at 314.
224. RADOSIN RAJOvIt, AUTONOMIJA KOSOVA: ISTORIJSKO-PRAVNA STUDIJA 64 (Beograd 1985).
225. Id. at 65.
226. 1 DIMITRIJE TUCOVI(t, SRBIJA I ALBANCI, supra note 222, at 29 (quoting Strategijske take u
Arbanii).
227. Id. at 75-76 (citing MILOVAN OBRADOVIe, AGRARNA REFORMA I KOLONIZACIJA NA KOSOVU
1918-1941, at 83 (Prigtina 1981)).
228. Josip Broz Tito, Nacionalno piranje u Jugoslavgi u svetlosti narodno-oslobodilaike borbe,
[t7'shtja kombktare ne Jugosllavi ni driten e luftks nacional-qlirimtare], [The National Issue in
Yugoslavia in the Light of the War for National Liberation], PROLETFR, Dec. 16, 1942, reprinted in I
SRBIJA I ALBANCI, supra note 222, at 81; see also JOSIP BROZ TITO, NACIONALNO PITANJE I
REVOLUCIJA 59 (Beograd 1977).
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Consequently, the First Conference of the People's Liberation Com-
mittee for Kosova and Dukagjini, held December 31, 1943-January 2,
1944,229 proclaimed that it would respect the will of the people. Such a
declaration was in accordance with views proclaimed before and during
WWII. The Resolution, which was adopted on that occasion, reads in its
most pertinent part as follows: "[t]he Kosova and Metohija area is a re-
gion.., which has always as today, desired to unite with the land of [Al-
bania]. ' '230 The Resolution expressed the view that, as the result of
common struggle, the time would come when "all peoples, including the
[Albanians], [would] be in a position to declare themselves regarding their
fate, with the right of self-determination, including the right to seces-
sion. "231 According to the Resolution, the above-mentioned would be guar-
anteed by the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia; the National
Liberation Army of Albania; and the allies of the antifascist coalition: the
Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States.232 These views have
never been disputed. Nonetheless, the Central Committee of the Commu-
nist Party of Yugoslavia ("CPY"), in a letter addressed to the Regional
Committee of the CPY for Kosova and Dukagjini dated March 28, 1944,
criticized such views as premature, stating that they would prejudice the
solution of the national issue of the Albanians in Kosova. Yet, the letter
reiterated the determination to guarantee equality to all the peoples of
Yugoslavia and to guarantee their right to self-determination.
A second Resolution of the People's Committee for Kosova and
Dukagjini, adopted on July 10, 1945, acknowledged that the status of the
province would be determined in accordance to the will of the people.
Thus, both committee Resolutions recognize the right of the people of
Kosova to declare themselves regarding their fate and consequently recog-
nize the right of Kosova, as a separate political and territorial unit, to self-
determination.
E. The Principle of Self-Determination in Kosova
The Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosova,
which was signed in Rambouillet, France, on February 23, 1998, provides
the following:
229. Resolution of the First Conference of the People's Liberation Committee for Kosova and
Dukagjini, partially reprinted in ALEX N. DRAGNICH & SLAvKo TODOROVICH, THE SAGA OF KoSOVA:
Focus ON SERBIAN-ALBANIAN RELATIONS 143 (1984).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international
meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settle-
ment for Kosova, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of rele-
vant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of this
Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehen-
sive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider
proposals by any Party for additional measures.
233
According to the above-mentioned, the first criterion is the "will of the
people," which is in harmony with the principles of international law and
democracy. Yet, the Rambouillet Accords also envision the need to take
into consideration the "opinions of relevant authorities,"-that is, the most
powerful countries-in determining the future of Kosova, and the Helsinki
Final Act, which conditions the change of borders on the achievement of an
agreement.234
Other documents that deal with the Kosova issue are based on the
Rambouillet Agreement. Resolution 1244 envisioned the establishment of
an interim provisional administration in Kosova that would "facilitat[e] a
political process designed to determine Kosova's future status, taking into
account the Rambouillet Accords." 235
The Resolution does not deal with the status of Kosova and does not
set a time limit for the settlement of the final status. Nonetheless, the Reso-
lution recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, leaving Kosova within the borders of the FRY. 236
On one hand, the text of the Resolution is transitional in character as well
as final status oriented. On the other hand, it is possible for the powerful
states to interpret the text of the Resolution according to their own interests.
On May 6, 1999, the Foreign Ministers of the G-8 group reconfirmed the
view that the process to provide substantial self-government for Kosova
must take full account of the Rambouillet Accords and the principles of
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. 237
The right of peoples to self-determination is an undeniable right,
unless one questions the international order and the U.N. Only the timing
of the process is open for discussion, as fulfillment of the principle of self-
233. Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosova, ch. 8, art. 1, para. 3, Feb. 23,
1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999) [hereinafter Rambouillet Accords]; BAJRAMI, supra note
11, at 270-331.
234. Rambouillet Accords, supra note 233, at ch. 8, art. 1, para. 3; Helsinki Final Act, supra note
146.
235. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 1, 11 (e).
236. ld. l0.
237. G-8's "General Principles"for Solving Kosova Crisis, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 7,
1999, at 8.
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determination depends on a number of internal and external factors. More-
over, only Serb, Russian, or other nationalists who want to maintain the
territories they have annexed as well as national oppression dispute the
principle. It would be very tragic indeed if there were a need to argue the
principle of self-determination to democratic countries.
CONCLUSION
Restoration of Serbian authority over Kosova is an entirely unaccept-
able final status solution for Kosovar Albanians. Further, the international
administration of Kosova must end eventually. The future status of Kosova
must be resolved and based on the following premises: (1) the application
of the principle of self-determination, (2) the organization of plebiscite
under international supervision as a means to determine the will of the peo-
ple, and (3) the determination of status in conformity with the will of the
majority of the population.
